B Defending Divine Freedom Thomas D. Senor INTRODUCTION In a series of articles and most recently in his book Can God Be Frce?, villiam Rowe has argued that the traditional theistic view of the nature of God is fundamentally incoherent. In panicular, Rowe believes that: (i) God is essentidly omnipotent, (ii) God is essentially omniscient, (iii) God is essentially perfectly good, and (iv) God creates freely constiture an inconsistent tetrad. Furthermore, Rowe argues, the theist should not be prepared to give up (iv) because if God's "re"iirr. acrs are nor free, thgn Ggd is notpraisewonhy and it is not the case that God is properly thanked for his goodness towards his creatures. In dris paper, I'll e*amine Rowe's argumem for this inconsistency. while there is little doubt drat rhere is a prima facie problem here for the classical theist, Rowe's argument can be shown to be unsuccessful, or so I will argue. In tle next seJtion of this paper, I will expound Rowet position. Having done that, I will explain the three wap I think the argument is vulnerable. The three sections-afrer that will be dedicated to giving each objection its voice. I. ROIOTE'S ARGUMENT lowe b9grn1 his discussion by considering rhe correspondence between Gottried Leibniz and Samuel clarke in which, among other things, the two Thanls to Eric Funkhouser and Barry Vard for helpfirl conversations, Defending Diuine Freedom 169 eminent philosophers discuss the nature of divine freedom and its relation to creation. In what turns out to be a crucial component of his overall argument, Rowe writes the following: Following Iribm?. we can imagine God considering a variety of worlds he mi-ght create. one -bht b. a world in which there are no conscious cfennues at all, a world composed solely of dead marter. Another might be a world composed {at some stage in its history) of living, conscious cr€i$ures whose lives are meaningfirl, morallv !ood, a"d happy. Assume, as seems evident, that the second world is the ben., wJdd . .. If God were limited to these rwo worlds, he would fice t-hree choices: creating the inferior world, creating the superior worf{, greating ng world at all. For God to-decide to create no world wer creating a world that is' all things considered, a very good world, would be for God to do less than dre best that he can do. If ,o, it'6-. that God's perfect goodness would requirehimto cr€ate the very good world. But ifGod's perfect goodness requires him to create the very good world, rather than creating the inferior world, or not creadng a world at dl, what are we to make of that pin of the idea of God that declares that he created the world feety? To oy ttot God' frecly created the go:{ *9tld :*ms to imply that le-was h* ro. ao io ,o, that he could have created the inferior world, or refrained from creating either world. But if his perfect goodness ,requires him to create the good worl4 -how is it possible that he was free to create the inferior world or not to create any world? This is a simple way of picturing the problem of divine perfection and divine freedom.r A few pages later, Rowe states his Leibnizian afgument somewhat more formally: IARG 1l: 1. If God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and perfecdy good, then he chooses to create the best of dl possible worlds. 2. God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good' Therefore, 3. God chooses to creete the best of all possible worlds'2 In order ro get a good handle on Rowe's overall argumenr, rwo points need to be made. First, as the argument stands, the conclusion is not a threat to divine freedom. For it sals only that God will choosethe best world, not that God nust choosethe best world (or that, necessarily, God will choose the best world). Although in the text it is dear that Rowe understands the prgmises ro be not -"r.Iy true bur necessarily uue, rhe fact that this isn't explicit in r Rowe(2004: t2-13). 2 Rowe(2OM:16). 170 Thomas Senor the premises as they appear in the arg'ment is problematic. so let's make their modnl status explicit as follows: IARG 2]: l. Necessarily, if God exists and is omnipotenr, perfectly wise and perfectly good, then he chooses ro creare the best ofali possibie worlds. 2. Necessarily, God exists and is omnipotent, peifectly wise and good. Therefore, 3. Necessarily, God chooses ro creare tlre best of all possible wodds. Although this version of the argument does give us a conclusion that is plausibly inconsistent with divine crearive freedom, its weakness is thar it works only against the theist who accepts God's necessary existence and essencial omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness. However, none of these assumptions are cenral to the main thread of Rowe's argument. Here,s a version in the spirir of the kibniz/Rowe argumenr th*tioe, not depend on the modally strengthened theistic claims: IARG 3]: 1. Necessarily, if God exists and God exemplifies omnipotence, perfect wisdom, and perfect goodness in a stable manner, the'God .holr"s to create the best creatable world in every world accessible to God. 2. God exists and God exemplifies omnipotence, perfectly wisdom, and perfect goodness in a stable manner. 3Therefore, God chooses to creare the best creatable world in everyworld accessible to God. 4' If s does X in every world accessible to s, then s doesn't do X freely. 5. Therefore, God doesn't freely bring about the best creatable world. The. argument depends 1n the idea of a being's having a properry in astable m^anner. Property P is stable for a bein{B "t " iorld Vz in"(") nexemplifies P at dl times in \7a and (b) rherc iJ nothing B can do ,o *"L. it the case that B ceases to exempfi$' P in V. put somJwhat dif,cerently, if a person has a properry in a sraLrle way, there are no wodds accessibre ro her in which she doesn't have i1. Exemplifying a properry in a stable way is' for all practical p'rposesJ as limiting as h".'ilg itr*i prop..ry or*.iJt]. For example, suppose that in world W, nay hasih. ,t"bl.'6,,, accidentj) l,In order ,o T3k propely srabiliw friendly ro aremporaliss, rhe first condirion trffi ,Tff as : (r) b exemplifies p in $fl and there is no rinre whcn B fails ro exenrD efendi ng D i u i ne Freednm properry of being blind. Then not only does Ray not see-Ray canl seein 'W, even *rough there are other worlds in which Ray has 20120 vision. The second point that should be made about Rowe's kibnizian argumenr is that it presupposes that there is a besr of all possible worlds.a But it is by no means obvious that such an assumption is right. For ir's epistemically possible that rather than there being a single best world, there is an infinite hierarchy of better worlds so that for any world, there is a world better. In such a case, one might suppose, God's hands are not tied by his perfect goodness.'We will go into more detail about this in a subsequent scction, but for now the point needs to be made that Rowe's broader argumenr doesn't depend on this controversial assumption. For Rowe contends that if there is no best world, then there is another serious problem lurking: God might be free but God wouldn't be perfectly good. For, if there is no best world, then for any world that God creates there is a berter world that God could have created. And if God creates a wodd when there is a better world that God could have created instead, then God could have done better than he did. But if God could have been better than he did, then he is not perfectly good. Here, then, is Rowe's broader argument (although this pardcular presentation is mine): [ARG 4]: l. Either there is a best world or there is an infinite hierarchy of better worlds 2. If there is a best world, then the Creator is not free with respect to either creating at all or creating the world he creates. 3. lf there is an infinite hierarchy of better worlds, then the Creator is not perfectly good. Cl. Therefore, either the Creator is not free or he is not perfectly good. 4. Tbe Creator is God only if the Creator is a perfectly good being. C2. Therefore, either God doesn't exist or the Creator is not perfectly free. This argument is valid. In the sections that follow, we shall have a look at each of the premises ofARG 4. \7e will begin with the fourth premise and work backward. { For tlosc farniliar with what Alvin Plantinga (1974: Ch.9) calls 'leibniz's Lapse', the above argument doesn't crucially depend on the claim that God is able to bring about the best possible world. For Rowe's purposes, it is enough that there is a best feasible world, i.e., a best world that God is able to actualize. Having made this point, I will now ffffi|1f ignore it and speak as drough if there is best possible world, God can bring 171 I 172 Thomas Senor D efnding D io in e Freedn m To deny this is akin to thinking that when a child at age four conceives of her parents as all-knowing and morally perfect, and then at age seven has those illusions dashed, she should conclude that Mom and Dad don't exist. But that, of course, is silly. karning of her parents' fallibiliry does not make her an orphan. Now, of course, Rowe doesn't think that if his argument is successfrrl, he's shown that there is no Creator of Heaven and Eanh, but only that there is no 'God'. So in a sense, my point is, as they say, 'merely semantic'. However, when philosophers conclude that there is no God because they take themselves to have shown that no being could have one or more of the properties historicdly attributed to God, thgv are gaining a rhetorical advanmge they have not earned in the argument thqrve provided. III. PREMISE THREE-IF THERE IS AN INFINITE HIERARCHY OF BETTER'STORLDS, THEN GOD IS NOT PERFECTLY GOOD One might be tempted to respond to Rowe's Leibnizian argument by claiming drat there is no reason to think that there is a best world. For all we know, there might be an infinite hierarchy of very good worlds. If so, God would presumably have the freedom to create from among the infinite set of very good worlds. If God decides that it is bemer to create than not ro create, and God recognizes that there is a hierarchy of infinitely many very good worlds, then God will freely chose from among those possible creadons. Hence God's creative freedom is secured by an infinite hierarchy ofvery good wodds. Not so fut, thinks Rowe. If the Creator were to create a very good world in such a circumstance, then the Creator is not God. \7hy not? Because a perfectlygood beingwill always do the best that it is able to do. However, in the above circumsmnce, no mafter how good a world tlte Creator produces, he will not have done his best since there will be infinitely many better worlds that he could have created but chose not to. Rowe's precise statement ofhis crucial principle is this (Rowe calls it'Principle B'): If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a bemer world it could have created, then it would be possible for there to be a being morally bener than it.8 Such a being would not be perfectly good because it isn't possible for there to be a being better than a perfectly good being. Therefore, ifthere is an 173 II. PREMISE FOUR-'THE CREATOR IS GOD ONLY IF THE CREATOR IS PERFECTLY GOOD' 'we will spend considerably more time on the 6rst t}ree steps of the argument than we will on this founh premise. Although Rowe doesn't state the premise in quite this way, the text makes it clear rhat he is commimed ro it as sated in 4.:'s?hat he has in mind is plain and common in the circles rg whic! analytic philosophers of religion ru* In as much as the concept of God is the concept of a being with all perfections, and perfect goodnk is a perfection, then if there is no perfecdy good being then there is no God, i.e.' God doesn'r exist. However, there is something very anificiar about all this. For my_money, thele are two good, related options for deciding the conrent of 'God' and neither entails that if there is no perfectly good b-eing, then there is no God. First, we might treat 'God' as a prop.r-rrr-., "ndthen if the theist is a Kripkean direct reference-theorist about names (as I think she should be), she'll think that the term has reference bur no sense. And the reference will be secured by an initial baptism rhat dates back to the ancient Hebrews, and a successful causal chain ihat links up that (those) baptismd acs with our current use. Alternatively, the dreist might think of 'God' as a kind term. It is presumably something like this that Rowe has in mind when he says if *":. i: .no. ggrfec.tlf good being tllen God doesn,t exist: nothing is of the divine kind if nothing is perfectly good. Now I think the most.ri'trrrd *"y olmat<ing sense of the way standaid theists (as opposed to philosophers of religion) understand 'God'when they aren't using the ..r* ". a nrm. isagain along Iftipkean lines: God is a supernatural kind with the intensional contenr of the term 'God' being like 'the personal crearor who revealed fim11t{t9 the Hebrew people',6 and with the extension being fixed (again) in a lGipkean, causd manner.T As I said, though, I think'God'is generally used as a name byworshippersin churches, synegogues, and mosques. OF course, it is true th"t th"ists mafte lots ofother claims about the essence or narure ofthis being, but none ofthese assertions is such that'God'fails to refer ifone or moreLn,t t ue, , 5 For orample, Rowe (2oo4:89) writes: '[I]f the actual world is not the best world rhat an omnipotent omniscient being could create, God does not exist.'6 As I have the intension stated, it does contain some descriptive content so this isn t a. pure lftipkean theory. I take it that if the Hebrew prophets r rere sufferinq from hallucinations, the causes ofwhich were the roors ofa typiofirrant they had conirmed, we should think that the theistic G-od doesn't exisr, no, .i", ir'i, " t ar,ia".g.r:-**-7 For rnore on these issues, see Senor (1992). 8 Rowe (2004:89). Fl i D efe nding D iu i n e Fr e e do rn L/)174 Thomas Senor infinite hierarchy of good worlds and the Creator chooses ro crear€ one of them, the Creator is not God (who by definition is perfectly good). Daniel and Frances Howard'Snyder have argued against Principle B by telling a story comparing two creators who find themselves having to choose among rhe infinitely many good wodds.e Jove and Juno both decide that since among the very good worlds, every world is such that there are infinitely many ve{F good worlds better than it, the only reasonable way ro choose a particular world ro creare is to first create a randomizing device that will choose among the very good worlds. Suppose, the Howard-snyders suggest, we begin with the minimally good very good world and assign to it the first positive integer and assign the second positive integer to the second minimally good very good world and continue this way, thus maldng a one-to-one correspondence between very good worlds and positive integers. Jove uses the randomizing machine to choose the world to create, and it spits otrt the number 777;Jove then creates that world. Juno's randomizer spits out 999 and Juno creates that wodd. Now the Howard-Snyders argue that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent since they have followed precisely the same method for creating a world. The only difference benveen rhe two concerns the results of the randomizing machine. But if that is correct, rhen Principle B is false, since it would have us conclude straighraway that Jove is not perfectly good. Rowe agrees that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent, but he thinks rhat neither one is morally perfect. Rowe contrasts Jove and Juno with another god used in another example by the Howard-snyders (although the example is amended by Rowe). Thor also ceares with rhe help of a randomizer, but Thor's standard of minimal goodness in a world he might create is higher than that of Jove and Juno. Worlds I -800 are deemed by Thor as not good enough ro crerte given the infiniry of better worlds. So Thor's randomizing device has world 801 as the least good world and the machine selecrs world 888 for crearion. Rowe argues that even though the world that Thor creates is inferior ro thar created by Juno, Thor is morally superior to bothJove andJuno because Thor has a higher scandard ofworld acceptabiliry; that is, some of the worlds deemed good enough to create by Jove and Juno are deemed not good enough by Thor. Hence, Rowe insists, Thor is better. Better, but not morally perfect because Thor doesn't create the best world he's capable of (he could have brought about any one of the worlds in dre infinite hierarchy). Therefore, the bottom line is that Rowe thinks because Principle B is correct, if there is an infinite hierarchy of good worlds, then the Creator isn't perfecrly good so God doesn't exist. There is a temPdng reply to Rowe's use of Principle B that-can be.found (or is at l"".t rogg;"rt"I) in ihe writings of several Prominent philosophers'ro ih" obl".tiorrT .oughly that il necessarily, there is no weyto avoid creatinjaworld than which there is a (creatable) better, then God's creating , *orlj than which there is a better doesn't count tg?inst God's moral perfection.' There is a weaker and a stronger way to understand this claim. The *.J., reading is that' in the circrlmsatrces described, God would not be calpabh for crlting a srrrpassable world-that is, God doesn't do anything f"i*hi.h he is to 6'lu-e.-H.r.'r the principle that could be appeded to in support o[*lis claim: Pl: If, S necessarily does X tlen S is not to blame for doing K Although Rowe will grant the tru*r of Pl and its application to the case i' q.r.Ji.rrr, the objeJtion understood this way isn't sufficiently strong as a ,oponr. to Rowe's argumenr. For, while never being culpable for an action i, , n.."rr"ry conditiin for perfect goodness, it zurely isn't sufficienu that is, perfect goodrr.ru is more than perfect blamelessness' Suppose Adolft essential m-oral character is such that committing murder on a massive scale is something he does at every world at which he has the chance. In such a case, Adolf is not" to bhme for his murderous ways' So Rovre can "c..pt Pf and insist that it poses no problem. for him: he isn't claiming that in ,h" pr"r.nt 'no best *oild' r..n"tio God is bkmeworthy for-creating a *orld .h*, is surpassable, but only that God is not morally perfect if God does so. The stronger reading of this objection is not subject to this response but it also is ,rot"ro .learf right. According to the strong readin$' creating a world that is not as gooi " world as the being might have created does no. *ott. egunst ryuiect goodness when there is simply no way to avoid it' Here's the general PrinciPle: P2: If S necessarily does K then S's doing X does not count against S's moral perfection. Even apan from the considerations that drive us here, there is reason f., J."!ii"g p2. Think back to Adolf. Although he can't be blamed for ar, ..r"nti.liefect in his character, Adolf's having that essential defect guarantees that he will never be completelygood at any given world' Fo, h"rring a murderous character rulei out the possibiliry of moral perfecdon. ro obiections alons these lines can be found in Hasker (fonhcoming); \(ainwright (1999); Monis (1993)] and Kreuman (1990)'e Howard-Snvder (1994, 1996). I 176 Thomas Senor ThatP2 is a fair understanding of the reasoning behind at least some of those objecting in this manner can be seen clearly in this quotation from Villiam l7ainwright (as quoted by Rowe): But... a type of complaint which is dwap in place is never in place. A complaint is only legitimate when the person whose conduct is criticized could have acted in such a way that he or she would not be exposed to a complaint of that type.rl Yet we see in the case ofAdolf that we should agree with the above sentiment only when it is culpabiliry that is at issue. That a Person couldn't possibiliw have avoided a bad course ofaction can show that the person is not perfectly good even if she isn't blamewonhy for performing ic So what if we amend the principle slightly to avoid cases like that ofAdolf, To wit' P3: If in a given circumstance C, it is logically impossible for any Person who 6nds herself in C to avoid taking a certain course of action A' then doing A does not count against A's perfect goodness. The problem with P3 is that without some helpful, further description of C, ir is clearly false. For instance, suppos€ I have promised to return your bicycle this afternoon, but having desperatelywanted to buy a couple new games for my Xbox 360, I hawked it where upon it was immediately misrakenly destroyed in a trash-compacting accident. Now no one in mY circumstances would be able to avoid taking the course of action of failing to give you back your bike after promising to return it. However, surely mv being in this position couna against my being perfecdy good. Suppose we were able to find a principle, call it 'P4' , in the spirit of P3 but that was apparendy unassailable. Would that settle the matter against Rowe? Rowe doesn't think so. For suppose P4 is glus-i.s., that since God's creating a world that is surpassable is necessary or unavoidable for anyone, having created a surpassable world is not a sign of God's moral imperfecdon. (Again, because doing what no one could possibly avoid c:ln count against one's moral perfection.) Nevertheless, suppose there is an inGnite hierarchy of worlds and that, as things go, God creates very good world Wl when he could have created even-better world I$72 (or even-better-than-that world l$73, etc.). Then God has done someching that is not necessary (create W'l) and such that he could have done better (create world \72 or a better world than thar). And this much seems undeniable. But if it is right, then given Principle B (i.e., If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it could have created, then it would be possible for there to be a being morally better than it), we get the conclusion that God is not morally perfect (and hence is not God). In other words, Rowe wins. rt must be granted ::f::;'::'*y"cant initiar 0,"**;; However, as Rowe himself points out,r2 the plausibiliry of a principle must be judged (at least in pan) by the plausibiliry of that with which it is inconsistent. And if it is more plausible rlat the infinite hierarchy ofworlds thesis is consistent with the possibiliry of a perfectly good, omnipotent being than it is that Principle B is true, then we have some reason to doubr the truth of the laner. One point that Edward'Wierenga (2002) makes rather quicldy but that I think deserves a more thorough hearing is the difference infinigv makes.'SThereas Principle B might be very plausible giaen the existence of a bat world (or worlds), when the possibiliry of an infinite hierarchy of good worlds is introduced, its plausibiliry drops dramatically.l3 That this should be the case isn't too surprising: the logic of infinite series is rather different than that of finite series. To see this illustrated rather dramadcally, let's briefy consider an exchange between \Tilliam lane Craig and Paul Draper on the Kalam argument for God's existence.la Craig has argued that there qrnnot be an actually infinite set of real objects because such sets bring with them absurd consequeoces. Craig discusses Hilbert's Hotel and other well-known implicadons of actual infinities. For example, if you add a blue book to a set of infinitely many red bools, you end up with a set with the 'same number of members' (i.e., infinitely many) that you had before you added the blue book. Funhermore, if instead of adding a single blue book, you were to add infinitely many blue boola to the set of infinitely many red books, you'd still end up with a set of infinitely many members even though that is precisely 'the number' of books you had in the first place. In his response, Draper claims that Craig's position amounm to noting that the following triad of propositions is inconsistent, and to resolving the inconsistency by rejecting the third. The propositions in question are: S1: A set has more members than that contained by any of its proper subsets. 52: If the members of fwo sets can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence, then neither set has more members than the other. 53. There are adually infinite sets. Each of these propositions is initially plausible. But when one sees that the uuth of 53 implies that either Sl or 52 is false, one realizes that one of these initially credible propositions will have to go. If we accept 53, th€n we'll have to dump 51 and 52. Now the key to seeing how to reasonably 12 Rowe Q0M:120-l). rr Merenga (2002).tr Craig (2003) and Draper (2003).rr Rowe (2004: 118); taken frorn \Tainwright (1999:92). 178 Thornas Senor do this is to see that Sl and 52 are unquestionably true wben applied to fnite sets. So we needn't deny either if we were to so limit their domains of application to the finite.'\7hen we apply Sl and 52 to infinite sets, however, we should immediately sense that sometiing is amiss because there isn't a narural, rational or real numb€r thar is'the number of members'of an infinite ser; rather the set contains infinitely many members. So if 'more' means 'a greater number'then S1 is clearly false for infinite sers. However as Draper"points out, there is surely a stiaight-forward intuitive ,.rrr" in which, for the example, the set of all positive integers 'has more members' than the set of euen positive integers; every member of the latter set is also a member of the former set, bur the former ser has members that are not in the latter set. Now if 'has more members' can be understood as 'has wery member and then some', then we have a way of making sense of 51, and we c:rn see that Sl is true even of infinire sers. However, on this understanding of 'has more nrembers', 52 will turn out to be false. For the set of all positive integers crn put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of all even positive integers even rhough the forrner clearly'has more members' in rhis second sense ofthe phrase. \7hat is the point of this aside into the Kalam argument and actual infinities? I believe this provides us with a good illustration what's wrong with Rowe's steadfast conviction that Principle B is true. Principles Sl and 52 are not only prima facie plausible but are obviously uue if we confine their domain to finite sets. However, if we assume the existence of actually infinite sets, tlen they cannot both be true. My claim is that som€thing similar is going on regarding Principle B. Suppose that there is an omniscient Creator and a single best, creatable world. Now if in this circumstance, the Creator fails to produce the best creaable world, then he could have done better (i.e., made a better world) than he has in fact done.'\Vhat could account for this?'S7ell, contrary to the claims of Roben Adams and William !?ainwright, it can't be that tire perfectly good Creator vdued something other than goodness/perfection in a world. For what makes a world the be* uorld is its overall value and not simply is rnoral goodness or general perfection; if there is a single best world, it will be a world which exemplifies whatever or}rer goods an omniscient, perfectly good being values. Given that the single best world is creatable by rhe Creator, it would seem that the only explanarion for its not being produced is a defect in the will of the Creator. He lacks the volition to do his best. But if the Creator lacfts the volition to do his best, then he could have been better (as Principle B says). Hence the Creator is not perfectly good in this scenario. Consider now the situation in which there is no best world but an infinite hierarchy of very good worlds. If the Creator, recognizing his predicament, Defendi ng D i u in e Fre edom 179 decides to use the Howard-Snyders' randomizing machine and thereby produces a very good, but surpassable world, shall we say that he's done his best? This is admittedly a hard question to answer unequivocally, and that is because in these circumstances there is no such thingas doing one's best. On the one hand, we might grant, this method for choosing a world to create is, in principle, as good as can be had in the (necessary) circumstances; on dre other hand, no matter what world dre machine randomly selects, the Creator could have brought about a better world. Yet unlike the situation in which there is a best world that the Creator nevertheless does not bring about, the problem here isn't with his volition or nature. For he is aware of his situation and so knows that it is logically impossible for him to produce an unsurpassably good creation. And it is logically impossible for him to do his best not because of an imperfect will or a faw in his essence, but because of the enernd, necessary circum$ances. In this case, it is impossible for him to produce an unsurpassably good creation because it is impossible for anyone in these necessary ciranmstancesincluding the being fian which none greater is possible-to do it. Note that this is a different point dran that which \07ainwright et. al. are making: they claim that ifdoing X is not possible for a particular person, then that person's failure to do X doesn't rule out her being perfectly good. But the Adolf example shows fiis is mistaken. The principle I am appealing to is this: if doing X is logically impossible even for a p€rson with a nature as mordly perfect as is logically possible, then that person's hilure to do X doesn't rule our her being perfectly good. Ifthere is an infinite hierarchy of increasingly good wodds, then the creative product of a morally perfect (i.e., a perfectly good) Creator will be surpassable. Thus, while Principle B is true if there is a best world (or worlds), if there is an infinity of increasingly good worlds, then rhis prima facie principle mrns out to be false. IV. PREMISE T\TO-IF THERE IS A BEST TORLD, THEN GOD IS NOT FREE \TITH RESPECT TO EITHER CREATING AT ALL OR CREATING TTIE WORLD GOD CREATES \7e've already looked at the major component of the justification for the premise; it is the Liebniz-inspired argument I have oudined three versions of above. kt's focus on the second version, viz., ARG 2. l. Necessarily, if God exists and is omnipotent, perfecdy wise and perfectly good, then he chooses to cr€ate the best of all possible worlds. 2. Necessarily, God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good. \ I r80 Thomas Senor Defe ndi ng Diu in e Fre edn rn 181 Therefore, 3. Necessarily, God chooses ro creare the best of all possible worlds. Note that the conclusion of this argumenr doesn'r explicitly say that God is not free wirh respect to bringing abour rhe best of ali possible worlds. To get that conclusion explicitly we need an additional premise: 4rf God' necessarily chooses ro creare the best of all possible worlds, then God doesn't freely choose ro create the best of all possible worlds. The justificarion for this premise is given by Rowe in the following passage: Thus far we have supposed with kibniz that among possible worlds there is one that is best. And we have argued thar given God's absolute perfection, he would of necessity create the besr world. Ifthe reasoning for this conclusion is correct, then in the mamer of creadng among possible worlds, God cannot be &ee.rt The point, then, is this: if God's creating rhe best world is necessary, rhen God is not able to refrain from creating the best world (since jhere is no wodd ar which God doesn't create rhe best world). But if one can'r refrain^from a given acrion, then one isn't free with respect to that action. Therefore, God isn't free wi*r respecr to creating the best wodd. One mighr think that while it mighr be somewhat disappointing if it turned our rhar God isn't free with respecr ro crearing, the theist coull give up divine freedom with respect to creation withoui sacrificing anyth"ing terribly significant. Rowe, however, disagrees. He thinls that if-God is not frc9 yrrh r€spect ro crearion, then God isn't free generally. And, if God isn't free, then God is not to be thanked for the good things God does, nor is God worlbr of_praise since both thants and praise require the agent's ability to refrain from the relevant acrions.r6 suiely, we mu$ agree-with Rowe that if the necessiry of God's creating the best world entailsihat God is neither to be thanked nor praised, then the necessity of God's creating the best world would entail some substantial changes in the way the theisr sees God. There are, then, three questions that need addressing with regard to the expanded ARG 2: (i) Does God's essential nature, tigether vlrt .t. assumpdon that there is a single best creatable world entail that God will bring about that world?; (ii) If the answer to (i) is .yes', does that imply that God doesn't freely bring about that world?; and (iii) If that answerio both (i) and_(ii) is-'yes', does that imply that God is not to be *ranked or praised for his beneficial actions? 15 Rowe (2OO4:74). . ,u -Ol Rowe (2004: 2), Rowe daims that if God is not &ee, then ,it can be arsued, that God is not praisewonhy, nor wonhy of our thanlis and graiitua.. --- -- --D-'rvA. Does God's nature €ntail that God will create the best if there is a best? Although Robert Adams and rvilliam \fainwright are officially on record with a_ negadve answer to dris quesdon,lT I'ir inclined to agree with Rowe here. Given that we understand the 'best' worrd as tf,e world that has the greatest overall combination of value, then ir seems ro me that if God is essentially perfectly good, then God wiil want to bring about the best overall state of affairs that he can. Now perhaps the best overall world is not the world with the happiest o, ,rroit beautiful and or supremely gifted inhabitana; perhaps the best overall world is a world in which there is ample room for grace and unmerited love (as Adams and \Tainwright think). But on the assumption that some creaable world contains uniquely the best overall combination ofvalue, then God's perfect goodness would seem to insure that God would have the wil to bring that world about. In any event, for the purpose of this paper, I don't inteird to deny this. IV.B. If, necessarily, God brings about the best creatable world, does that imply that God isn't &ee? Rowe is rrpfront about his incompatibilist sensibility: the fact that God qmnot refrain from creating the best world guaraniees that God is not free with respect to creating that world. Howiver, despite Rowe's carefirl reasoning, I find that if I am not keeping his argumeni firmly in mind, I can lose TI grip on just how it is that God lacks the requisite Fr""do*. In an effon to look at the issue from another angle, leJs think about what the theist says about how divine acrs are produced.ls Being omniscient, God knoys jn any given situation what the best thing is for Cod to do. re Being perfectly good, God will want to do the action that is best. Furthermore] God's omnipotence surely requires that God will have the ability to bring about the best that God can do in a given situatio.r. Suppore, tlen, ii circumstance C, doing X is the best thing that God """ d". Then Godwill know that doing X is the best available acrion, and God wiil want to perform it. since God will have no competing desires (say from inclination or simple self-interest) to thwan God's desire io do the best thing, and since t7 {dams (1972) andVunwright (1996).ta Points similar to some of those I am making in the discussion that follows can be found in l7iereng (2002). te Stricdy'tfie best'here is the best that the being is able to do at the time" 182 ThomasSenor God is perFecdy rational, God will form the volirion to do X. And since nothing exrernal can srop God from doingwhat God intends, God will do X. So we've deduced that God will do X from the assumption rhat God is omniscient, perfectly good, omnipotenr, and rarional. Now so far our only conclusion is simply thar God will do X and from rhar proposition no immediate inferences can be drawn about God's freedom. As we have seen above, the problem is that a sffonger conclusion can be argued for. For, if it is the case that given God's essendal attributes, there is no world at which God fails to bring about the best oeation thar he can, then it is necessary that God bring about the best world he can.2o Furtherrnore, even if God exhibits these properties in only a stable manner, then there will be no worlds accessible to God at which God refrains from doing God's best. And from that conclusion, togerher with the libertarian assumption that freedom requires the ability to refrain in precisely the same circumstances, a conclusion abour God's lack of freedom apparently does follow. 'While recognizing *re srrengrh of the intuition that lead philosophers to claim that freely doingA requires the abiliry to refrain from doing A in the very circumstances of the action, I can also feel the pull of thinking of God's acrions as free even though God fails rhe'can refrain'condidon. Perhaps a litde reflection on the reasons for the'can refrain' condition will help us understand why God's failing that condition might not be so problematic. There are, I think, three kinds of cases that strongly motivare rhe 'can refrain' condition. They are: (a) rhe problem of past causally sufficient condirions for the acrion rhar not only pre-date the volition ro perform the action trut pre-date the exisrence of the actor; (b) concerns about manipulation by other agenrs; and (c) worries about internal compulsions (e.g., addiction/psychokrgical disorder cases). Regarding (a): if events thar occur billions of years before I was born, together with laws of nature that were also in place billions of years before I was born, conspire ro s€r in morion a sequence of events that are causallv sufficient For my performing A, the claim thar I am neverrheless doing A freely seems far fetched. Why? Because I did not exist when the mamer of my doing A was settled. Notice, however, that in rhe case of God's doing X there are no conditions or events spaddly or tempordly prior to God which dercrmine God's acrions. Yes, God couldn't refrain from X-ing in circumstance C but there is no set of past series of evencs and causal laws that is responsible for this. zf .Keep in mind rhat we are assurning in dris secdon ofthe paper that there is a best world and that there is not an infinite seiies oFincreasingly good worlds. Defending Diaine Frcednm 183 Regarding (b): This discussion can be very quick. If my performing a ceftain acdon is the result of my being manipulated by a nefuious neurosurgeon, devious hypnotist, or controlling creator, then the ultimate cause of my actions is the intentional state the agent who has programmed me. My actions aren't free because another €ent is the source of them. Needless to say, this freedom-compromising condition isn't relevant to the volitions and actions of the omnipotent Source of Being. Regarding (c): Since God is perfecdy rational and his volitions and actions ar€ produced by his recognition ofthe best course ofaction and his desire to do the best, there can be no worry rhat God's actions are the result of analogues of human cognitive malfunction brought on either by addiction or psychological disorder. Notice too that the claim that God always does the best because it is the best isn't to be understood as God's having some kind of non-rational, knee-jerk response to the goodness of the action in question. Rather, God's reason for having the volition God has, and for performing the action God does, is God's recognition of the reasons for performing the action in question, God's knowing and appreciating all the reasons for refraining from that action, and God's seeing that the reasons for performing the action are weightier than the reasons for refraining. It's God's understanding of the reasons that leads God to act as God does. So three primary motivations that lead libertarians to insist that our &eedom requires the ability to refrain are simply out of place where God is concerned. That is to say, God's volitions and actions will pass those drree tests even though God lacla the abiliry to refiain from doingwhat God sees as the best thing m do. \$7hile a libertarian will rypically insist that freedom requires the abiliry to refrain, she will not offer that as a complete analysis of free action. In fact, I can see no reason for a libertarian to not agree with the compatibilist rhat what we might call 'effective choice' is a necessary condition for free action. One has effective choice regarding an action A if and only if one can do Aif ou so wilhand refrain from doingA if one uills.2t A free action would seem to require that my action be able to reflect my volitions. Yer libenarians believe that it's not enough that a person be able to do A if zt ThisphrasingcomesftomJonathanEdwards(amongothers).SeeEdwards(1957). Unrclated to Edwards, a teferee commenting on an earlier version of this paper has noted that this condition needs the addidon of the requirement that it be possible thet either one will A or rhat one will that one not do A. For without that condition, onc has effective choice over actions one can neither will to do nor will to refiain fiom doing and that is (to say the least) implausible. I agree with the reader but make the point only in a footnote inbrder to keepin focu theiondition in the text. Of course, in the case at hand, this addition is not a problem: there is no quesdon about it being possible for God to have the relevant will. I 184 Thornas Senor she wills and refrain from doing A if that's what she wills. For, if her will is determined by events outside her conuol, then her acdon won'r be free even if she would be able ro acr on a different will if she had one. so, even if God's creating the best world is necessary (or at least unavoidable) given God's narure, the theist can still craim that God's creative act satisfies the following conditions: God has effective choice over his creative decision (i.e., compatibilist freedom); Neither the volition to creare nor the creative act is strictly the result ofan antecedent causal condition that predates God,s existence; God's creadve action is not *re result of a non-rationar internal force. Notice that regarding human agena in a deterministic world, the best that could be said is that conditions (i) and (iii) would hold. That is, the tlree conditions could not be satisfied by an agent in a deterministic world; so a morg ggngral account of dre nature of freedom along the lines of (t-(iii) would be libertarian. However, the addict who can'tLis th. temptation to take druss and persons with psychological compulsions are not free with respect to volitions/actions produced by their addiitions/compulsions, since those actions are the result of non-rational, internal forces. 'ihe same goes for various unfonunate (although fictitious) individuals whose volitionsld actions are the result oFnefarious neurosurgeons or hypnotists. The upshot of all of this is that given ihat Godt-creative act satisfies the above three conditions, why should God's inabiliry to refrain require us to deny that God's act is free? For what does the 'inabilitv to ,.doirr' .ome to here other than the inability to act against what he iras ttre best rslson to do? can we really say God would only be free in this context if God were to be able to act against what God sees as the clearly best thing to {o, the thing that he has every reason to do and no good reason not to do? That is, that divine freedom would entail the poJiuiti.y of divine irrationaliry? IV.C. If God is not free, is God not appropriately thanked or praised? Even if what I've suggested above is wrong and its being necessary tiat God performs an action entails that God is not free with-respect to rh"t acrion, I don't think ir follows that God is not to be thankei or praised. In panicular, I think that the idea that God's praisewonhiness depends on God's having the freedom to refrain from the good God does is plausible only if one has a needlessly narrow view of what-praisewonhiness "orrr., ,o. D efending D iu ine Fre edo rn I'm perfectly willing ro granr that morul praiseworthiness for an action A requires that the agent who performs the acdon was not caused to do the action by events independent of her character and motivations. As we have seen in the last pan of this section, however, this condition of praisewonhiness c:ln be satisfied by God even if God necessarily does the best (and *rey are not satisfied by anyone whose actions are determined by the past and laws of nature). Now it might be argued that there is another condition of moral praisewonhiness thar God can't satisfy: that an agent who is praiseworthy might have done things that are wrong or at least not the best the agent could do. Given what I said above, I tlink there is anuse ro be dubious of this condition. But let's waive such scruples and suppose rhat this condition is right. If it is, then God is not morally praisewonhy. But it hardly follows from this that God is not praiseworthy in some other sense. And I believe that it is another sense of praiseworthiness that is paramount in the theist tradition. 'W'lren theists claim tlrat God is to be praised, they often distinguish this from saying that God is to be thanked. \7try? Because God is to be praised for who God is; God is to be thanked for what God has /aaa. Now God's praisewonhiness is,surely not just a function ofour helplessness before God, of God's ability to do with us as God will. If God were a finite, although very powerful, tyrant, God would be able to dispose of us according to his pleasure but God would not be thereby praiseworthy. \fhat makes God praisewonhy includes his awesome power-the fact that not only is there no being as powerful as God but tlnt there could not be a being as powerful since God is the source of all power. While sheer power might make a being literally awesome, it wouldn't make it praisewonhy. What makes God praisewonhy is God's power together with God's narure as fair, merciful, and loving-God's embodying all that is valuable. God's nature as both the source of all that is and as a benevolent Creator is what makes God worthy of our praise. This sense of praisewonhiness does depend on God's naturally treating us a certain way,.but it does not depend on God's feely treatingus that w^y-at least not if such freedom requires the ability to refrain from ueating us as God does. Even if God isn't strictly speaking a moral agtnt because God isn't ruictly speaking a fitting subject of morapraise because God isn't free regarding the good things God does, God is nevenheless metaphysically praisewonhy if he is the ground of all being and power and yet treats zuch finite, fawed beings as ourselves with love, kindness, and mercy. I submit that when theists offer their praise to God in worship, they ate not intending to praise God as a moral agent but as rhe loving, benevolent source of dl being and power. Offering praise to the hero who saves lhe small child's life at great peril to her own well-being, 185 (i) (ii) (iii) 186 Tbomas Senor and offering praise to God for being the loving Creator of the Heavens and Earth is not to offer the same thing rc different individuals. The human hero has done something for which she is praisewonhy; God is praiseworrhy in virtue of being.\7lro God is. So much for praisewonhiness. What about thankfulness? Should we think that if God does not have the power to refrain from the blessings God bestows on us, then God is not ro be thanked? I think the answer to rhis is 'clearly not'. Suppose that you have a benevolent aunr who frequendy sends you gifts. Suppose yru knew that this woman did whar she did was because of her upbringing and very strong religious convictions. Indeed, suppose you knew that given your relative need and her relative plenry, her reladonship to you, and her belief in the importance of giving (particularly to family) she was not really able to resist giving you generous gifts.'Would your understanding of her situation release you of a dury to thank her for her kindness toward you? Of course not. 'We owe our beneficiaries a debr of thanls when, motivated by a concern for our well being, they besrow benefits upon us. In fact, it might be that the condition that the gift is given out of a 'concern for our well being'is overly restrictive. If I have a self-serving uncle who gives me a gift primarily because it will provide him with a significanr tax write o6 I still have a dury ro thank him provided rhat he was able to see rhat the gift would benefit me. His action needn't be praisewonhy; it must only be an undeserved benefit to mc. I conclude, then, that it is not evident that God's inabiliry to refrain from creating makes God unfree; still less is it wident rhat God's lack of creative freedom (if God indeed does lack such freedom) is inconsistent with God's praisewclrthiness or the appropriateness ofour offering thanks for his tender mercies. V. PREMISE ONE-EITHER THERE IS A BEST \TORLD OR THERE IS AN INFINITE HIERARCHY OF BETTER \TORLDS In frirness to Rowe, Iet me begin by noting that he never asserts premise one. In fact, Rowe mentions brielly a third option and credits Thomas Morris with suggesting a fourth. However, Rowe spends almost no time elaborating either of these other cwo possibilities, or on exploring dreir implicadons for his argument. The first he dispenses widr in a footnote and the second gcts no discussion at all after being mentioned. In this secdon, we'll look at what can be said for each of rhese possibilities and what irnpact they have on Rowe's conclusion. In addidon to the two options mendoned in the first Premise' there is the possibiliry that drere is no uniquely best world because there is more than one *o.ld with precisely the same, unsurpassed level of goodness. That is, there might be a de at the top. Recognizing that this is an epistemic possibility, we should ask rwo questions: how plausible is the claim that th.r. ir a de for best world *rat, if it were true, would help the theist out of Rowe's problern? One reason for thinking there might be a tie is discussed by Rowe when he considers Aquinas'view that there is an infinite hierarchy of good worlds.22 one might think, Rowe says, rhat such a series is irnpossible since each world will contain God, who is infinitely good and absolutely perfect. So everyworld (or at least weryworld with God) will be infinitely good' So there is a massive tie-every world with God is precisely as good as every other: each is infinitely good. Rowe's reply to this line of reasoning depends on making a distinction berween quaniitative and qualitative goodness, and then claiming that, while every world with God will contain an infinite quantity of goodness, wori<is might yet differ with respect rc rhe quahty of gogdlesl I haven't the space i"t.-to get into the details, but I will say that I find Rowe's replv lnery uncontnincittg. For, however compelling is the claim that any world with God containi an inf ite (and so eqtal) quanti4' of goodnes will be matched equally, I would think, by the claim that any world with God conudns "r, i.tfini." (and so equal) quality of goodness. Rowe denies this and thinks it plausible that worlds with agreater diversiry of kinds of lreings will contain " gr.*,.. qualiry of goodness rhan worlds with fewer kinds of beings, "ln"tiif all worlds also contain God. Therefore, Rowe thinla, the chit that dl worlds are equally good because all contain the infinite goodness of God can be reasonably resisted.- \0rhether I'm correct that there is .iust as much reason to think that the presence of God guaranrees a rie in qualiry of goodness as it does a tie in iuantity ofgoodttess, or Rowe is correct in thinking thar greater ontological di,r"rsiry "*i """oun, for an increase in qualiry is, in the end, not ofgreat importance. For there is, I belieYe, a bemer response to the argurne"t Yt "I" noi considering for the Tie at the Top thesis. Although there |s n9 {ou!t that in adding up the total goodness of a world that includes God, God's goodness -ut, b. part of the equation,there is no reason to include bod's goodness when comparing the worlds that God can bring about since 22 T'tris disclssion begins near the borom in Rowe (2004: 39) and nrns through the top halfofpage 44. r87Defmding Diuine Freedom V.A The best worlds: a tie w I l I188 F' i: i.: Tltomas Smor 189 every world God can bring about is, obviously, a world tlat includes God. So there is simply no reason to include (and good reason ro exclude) God's goodness when evaluating and comparing worlds. Another way to make rhis point is ro say rhar the relwant unir of comparison is 'possible crearions' rather than 'possible worlds'.23 kibniz's claim that God would bring about the best possible world can (and probably should) be recast as the claim that God would produce the best possible creation. Since theism insists on the uanscendence of God, and on God's being distinct from creation, there is here no concern that all possible creations will be infinitely good because they each contain God; no possible oeation includes rhe Creator as a paft. And with the God out of the picrure (so to speak), there is no worry (at least as far as I can tell) that all crearions will contain the same quantiry and qualiry of goodness. Because the phrase 'best possible world' is so entrenched in the discussion of the issues we are concerned with here, I will not avoid using it in the remainder of this paper. But it should be understood that, e.g., rhe claim 'God will bring about the best possible world'is shonhand for'God will bring about the best creation he is capable of bringing about (i.e., thebest fearibb creation)'. So we are back where we sraned at the beginning of this secdon: can we rule out the apparent epistemic possibility drat there is no single best world because there is more than one world with unsurpassed goodness. Even if it is not true that every world is ded for the 'best world' dtle, why should we assume that either a single world is best or else every world is surpassable? Is there any re:non to rule out the possibiliry that there ar€ rwo or more unsurpassable worlds? One might think that, while it can't be entirely ruled our, the claim that there is a tie for the 'best world' designation is pretty implausible. I mke it that Rowe thinls this and that is why he only briefly mentions this possibiliry and in the end discusses it only in a footnote. Fio*"u.r, I want to defend the rie possibility as being every bit as plausible as the best world hypothesis. In fact, I want ro say something stronger: if both the infinite hierarchy thesis and the founh possibiliry (which we will discuss in the next part of this section) are false, then the tie hypothesis is true. That is, the one possibiliry thar seems very, very unlikely is that there is a single best world. Here's why. \7hat it would take for a world to be the best world is for the amount of value at that world to be greater than that ar every other world. The best world isn't the world with the greatest volume or densest mass or rhe one thar lasts longest; the criterion for'best'world is a function of world value. Now 2r. In keeping yfr *, earlier point, it is acnrally 'feasible' rather than .possible' creaflons tnat are relevant here. D{nding Diaine Freedom one would assume that moral vdue is a major player here, but there is no good reason to think it is the only one. That is, given the plausible assumpdon ofvalue pluralism (i.e., there is more than one irreducible kind of vdue), the best world would likely include whatever other kinds of value there might be as well. That is, it would be the world that contained the highest arnount and qualiry of value or values possible. Now, as I understand it, this is the sole criterion on which worlds are judged in the 'best possible world' competidon. Any aspect of a world that doesn't make a value difference is irrelevant. But now suppose there is a world \71 that is a prima facie candidate for being the best world: it has an extremely large quantiry of extremely high-qualiry goodness, and very litde (if any) wil. In fact, let's stipulate thatVl's net goodness is unsurpassed. kt's go one step further. \Vl is not only unsurpassed in net goodness, but there is no possible way of combining values in a world tlnt is equal to the way those values are combined in \fi. Put slightly differendy, any way of combining values other than the way they are combined in\U7l will produce lower net value than that found in lVl. So we are supposing (for the sake of discussion) that there is a unique best way to combine values to get the ultimately valuable world and that Wl is it. So far, it looks as though \71 has a good claim to be the bem possible world. However, consider world W2: \72 is just like 'S71 in every way except that 1V2 contains one more item than S7l conains, and this item makes no value difference in V2. (W2 may contain an extra elementary particle, s,ry, or maybe an extra chair or blade of grass.) Or consider '\7'3' again the value equivalent of Wl and W2, but whose underlying non-normative 'stuff is a different kind than what is found in'!71 and W2. That is''W3 realizes all and only the vdue properties that Wl and V2 realizn, but these propefties supervene on a different type of rea\zing base. If either'\72 or \J(/3 is possible, then dthough the value of Wl will be unsurpassed, and ir will represent the best possible instantiation of value properties, it will not be the uniquely best possible world since V2 and !7'3 are equally as good. It would be helpful if I knew of a proof for the generd thesis that for any world \tr, if W exhibits the specific combination of realized value properties V, there is another world !7" that also exhibits V but which differs from \07 in some non-normative asPect. Howwer, I know of no such argument. Neverthess, the claim that the best combinadon of value could be had by worlds *rat differ in trivial, non-nornurtive ways is highly plausible, and we should conclude that it is more likely that there-is more than one unsurpassably good world than it is that there is a single, best world. 'What is the impact of this on Rowe's argument? One the one hand, it seems potentially significant. For Rowe apparendy thinls that the two 191 "T l I 190 D efndi ng D i u i ne Freednm primary options are those menrioned in the first premise. And were those options to have exhausted the possibilities, Ro*e has arguments in place that eirher God is not free or nor perfcctly good (i.e., thatihere is no God). But, if there are multiple best worlds, then God's perfect goodness, wisdom, and power will not guaranree that actualiry of any partiiular world. God's freedom, it would seem, will not be in jeopardy. futhough Rowe spends very little time considering the Tie at the Top hypothesis, he doesn't ignore it completely. He makes rwo points in response. Here's the first: []f there is a best action for God to perform (e.g., creating the best world), God creates the best world of necessity not fieely. And just as clearlv, if there are alternative best worlds for God to perform, he will of necessity, not freely, create one of them.2{ on the assumption that a null creation (i.e., a world at which God doesn't create anyrhing) wouldn't be among the alternative best possible creations, Rowe is certainly correcr that God's creating drat world ls necessary (or at least unavoidable). wrether it is rierefote nor fre. is not so obvious (as I argued in dre last secrion). And as we'll see in the nexr part of the next section, it isn't clear that the null world is not as good as oiher worlds God could make. The seco_nd point Rowe makes about the Tie at the Top hypothesis is found in a footnote. Here's what Rowe says: Even though there being several creatable worlds rhan which there are none berer appea-rs to leave God free ro create any one of these worlds, swinburne and other proponents ofthis view are still burdened with having to defend the rather implausible claim that the acrual world with all its evil is a wodd than which it is logically impossible that there should be a better world than it.2t It should be noted that, for reasons that have already sur6ced, the theist who adopts the Tie at the Top hypothesis is not necessarily saddled with this consequence. A Molinist can_ follow Plantinga in claiming that it is possible drat the best worlds are not feasible worlds because the trire co,rnterfa.tual, of freedom make them such that even an omnipore't being cannot weakly ac:.rnlize them. so, ar most, the Molinist is committed to tlie claim that the actual world is one of the best feasible worlds. There is a related concern for the theist if the Tie at the Top hypothesis is correcr because tlre best combination of values can be instaniiaiei in mor. than one worldGod's 'free choice' among the various b"st worlds would be analogous to the freedom one would h; i[ needing a box ofbreakfast cereal, one went to the rown's only store to find that*there were a grear many different boxes of the same size of Cheerios and nothing else. True, one would did not have to buy the box of cered one bought, but one's freedom is stricdy superficial. Now if the Tie at the Top hypothesis is true not because there is a single best combination of values that can be instantiated in more than one world, but because rhere is more than one possible combination of values that lead to maximd value in a world, then God's choice among the worlds would be more significant. For example, suPPose there are exacdy two unsurpassable worlds X and Y, and that both are equal in overall value. X' however, contains slightly more instances of autonomy (which I assume is component ofoverall value) but fe.wer instances ofaltruism (which I assume is also a component of overall value) than Y contains. Now God's choice between X and Y seems more significant than it would be if there is a single combination of value that can be instantiated either in wodds that don't contain precisely the same objects or in worlds with value-supervenience bases that are distinct while the supervenient values are precisely the sameFor although X and Y are equally good worlds, the value difference benveen them is not trivial. God might prefer worlds with greater alrruism to worlds with greater alrronomy even though God recognizes that the overall value of the worlds is the same. so a tie of this son does not lead to insignificant choices or to a freedom that is essentially meaningless. It's rhe difference between having only the choice of which of nrany exactly similar boxes of Cheerios to buy on the one hand, and having a choice beween your nro favorite cereals on the other. You might think the two are equally as good, but on a given day have a preference for one. Given your preference, your freedom here is not uivid. V.B. Incommerisurate worlds premise one of Rowe's argumenr is false if rwo or more worlds are tied for having the greatest value. However, there is another way that this premisecould-be falr.' there rnight be worlds that.are simply incommensurate.-If rhat is the case then there is neither a best world nor an infinite hierarchy of good worlds. FIow plausible is the thesis that there are incommensurable worlds? That depends, I would think' on whether or not value monism is true. If there is ". Lo,.orn one rype of value, then it would seem that for any worlds A and B, Awould be beiter than, worse than, or equal to B. For example, if Millian utilitarianism is true, then happiness is the only irreducible value. so dre value o{:a world is strictly a function of thcl net happiness at that world. If that is riglrt, then surely there are no two worlds that are incommensuf.ate. Thomas Senor :4 Rowe (2004:132). 2t Rowe (2OO4:4r. w 193r92 Thomas Senor D efe nd.i ng D iuin e F reednm Value monism, however, is not a very plausible thesis. And, if it is false, if value pluralism is true, then there would seem to be the possibiliry of incommensurabiliry. Thar's nor ro say that very instance of difi,cerenr value would always been incomparable to other insrances. For example, if we were to compare the value of the doodle on my page of notes wirh *rat of the sacrifice a war hero makes for his country, there would be little doubt that the doodle would lose: the value of the war hero swamps the insignificant value of my doodle. Still, arguably, the value of a great work of art and the value of a mordly very good (but not truly heroic) action might well be thought to be incomparable-even if the value of a great work of art loses out ro thar of a ruly heroic action. Although both rhe great work of art and the morally very good (but not heroic) action are insnnces of significant value, since their values are of fundamentally different rypes, ir's plausible m think that they cannor be put on the same scale. There is, of course, a sense in which they can be compared since they can bot} be seen to-have significant value. However, from the recognition rhat each is greatly valuable it does not follow that either is beffer, worse, or equal to rhetther. Given value pluralism, there are a number of fundamental, irreducible, intrinsic values. I assume that any best world candidate will be a world that exemplifies dl rhe sorts of fundamennl value that there are. In many qrses, both with respect to wodd s€gmenm and even whole worlds, these segmenm/worlds are commensurate-i.e., the state of a{hirs of John's consrructing a somewhar artistic doodle is less good than that of John's saving the life of a child. But not all cases "t tit .this. ?erhaps in situations where the quantitative and qualitative values of values of fundamentally differenr rypes reach a certairr threshold, there just is no way of comparing the state of affairs on a better than/less than/equal to scale. So there is a whole host of ways thar values can be combined to get the overall value of a world. Indeed, given the finititude of human powers of conception, rhere are likely possible values thar we simply don'r have the conceprual wherewithal to appreciate. Given a non-rrivial number of disdncr intrinsic values (including those, if any there are, that either aren'r instandated in our world or-th", *e dont irave the capability of recognizing) and all the ways that these values can be instantiated in a world, why shouldn't we think that there wili be many possible total combinations that are incommensurate? Indeed, perhaps there are an infinite number of incommensurably good worlds. And even if rhat seems unlikely, this much can be said: *. h".,n" .ro good reason for rhinking that there are nor any number ofvery good but incommensurate worlds. If there are ev€n two, t-hen it's neitherthe case that God's choice berween them is forced nor that for any world God creates, God could have made one thar was bemer. Now, even if all the above were to work' it might be thought that we've still got the general problem of creation: was God free with resPect to creating at all? If there are, say, a dozen incommensurate, very good creatable worlds, then won't God necessarily bring about one of those? As far as I can see, the answer to this last question is 'yes'. But that doesn't bring along the conclusion that God necessarily creates unless it is also true that the null creation is not one of the very good incommensurate worlds. But why shouldn't it be? Perhaps a world in which the only existent is a necessary, absolutely perfect being is incommensurate with a very good world that includes such a being but that also includes causally-dependent, contingent, non-perfect enrities. Even ifrhis claim doesn't strike one as self-evident or obviously true, what reason do we have for thinking that it is false? And if we think we can jrct see that a world with just God is of less value (is less good) than at least some worlds with God and contingent, created things' what is this confidence based on? I'm not suggesting vaiue scePticism in general. Perhaps what I have in mind could be qlled something like 'epistemic humiliry regarding the value of worlds'. Vhile the judgement that a-world that includes an overwhelming amount and qualiry of pain and suffering with relatively few (if any) oFsetting goods is inferior to a world in which the same inhabiants have little pain and suffering, much deep happiness' and there are a great number of other goods each had in abundance is unassailable, the more standard worlds each with a wide variery of different goods and 'bads'will be much more difficult to judge. One reason for this, if "oorr", is the vastness of worlds and the puniness of the human mind' \7e might not be in a position to make reliable judgements even when there are facts of the maner rega.rding the relative value of worlds. There is, however, a second potential reason for the difficulry we have in judging the comparative goodness of worlds. My proposal is that one reason for our inabiliryto make judgements in many of these cases is rhat such worlds are in fact incommensurable. So if there ar€ two or more incommensurate, very good, creatable worlds, and one of those worlds is a world with only God, then God can be free (in the srrong, libertarian sense) both with respect to creating at all and with respect to which world to create if God creates. For God's nafllre' togetheiwith God's options for creation will leave open the possibiliw of-God's not creadng at all, and they will also be consistent with God's bringing about any of ,h. itt*--ensurable creations. Notice too that if God-does have a choice berween multiple, incommensurable crearions, then God's choice is significant. For there can be substantial value differences in incommensurable worlds. The example of the values of the grear work ofarr and rhe morally good action serves to illustrare this. If each is valuable (or even very valuabli), but because their values are ofsuch different kinds, they r' I I' 195194 Thomas Senor are incommensurate, there is a basis for a preference, €ven a value-based preference. This is the point we discussed in the last paragraph of Section V. A regarding the possibility of distinct-but-equal combinations of overall value. Only the possibility in t-his section seems considerably more plausible: its not that there is a tie at t*re top, but that there are very good worlds whose value is incomparable. In such a case, God has the freedom to choose among rhese worlds and his choice can be grounded in what he happens to prefer. Now if his preferences a.re necessary, then we will have a problem pardlel ro that of the best world scenario. Although there will nor be a single best world, if fiere is a world that is necessarily preferred by God, then God will necessarily create it. But there is no reason to build such preferences into rhe nature of God. So his creating one of the very-good-incommensurate worlds can be free and yet substantial. CONCLUSION \Tilliam Rowe's argumenr that God must either not exist or not be free is wir:hout a doubt very powerful. It richly deserves the significant attention it has received. However, I believe that there is some reason to doubt each of the argument's premises, and to also be suspicious of Rowe's claims about the consequences of the Creator's being eirher not free or not perfecdy good. Furthermore, I believe that dre incommensurate wodds possibiliry is rather plausible, and if it turns out to be right, then God's crearing rhe world God created, as well as God's having created at all, can be free and significantly so in a way that does not compromise God's perfect goodness. REFERENCES Adams, R.,'Must God Create the Best?',inPhilosophicalReaiewsl (1972):317-32.' Craig, \7., 'The Kalam Cosmological Argument', in L. Pojman, Phitonphy of Religion: An Antholog (Belmonr, CA, and Memphis, TN: 'Wadswonh,2OO3): 24-9 (originally in V. Crag, Reasonabh Faith (Memphis, TN: Crossrvay , 1994). Draper, P., A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument', in L. Pojman, Philonphy of Religion: An Anthologt (Belmont, CA: Wadswonh , 2003): 42-7. Edwards, J., Freedom of the \Vill (1754), ed. P. Ramsev (New Haven, CT: Yale Universiry Press: 1957). Hasker, \X/., Proaidznce, Euil, and the Openness of God (London and New York: Roudedge,2004). Howard-Snyder, F., and D.,'HowAnUnsurpassable BeingC.an CreateaSurpassable \forld', in Faith and Philasoplry I I (1994): 260*8. -rThe Real Problem of No Best \7orld', in Faith and Philosophy 13 (1996): 4)) _\ Defending Diuine Freedom Kretzrnann, N., A General Problem of Creation', in S. MacDonild (ed.), Being and Goodness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). Morris, T., 'Perfection and Creation', in E. Stump (ed.), Rcasoned Faith (lthace, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Plantinga, lJ.vn, The Nature ofNecessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). Rowe, W'., Can God Be Freei (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Senor, f'., 'God, Supernatural Kinds, and the Incarnation', Relifout Studies 27 0992):353-70. \Tainwright, \(/., 'Jonathan Edwards, \Tilliam Rowe, and the Necessity ofCreation', inJ.JordanandD. Howard-Snyder(eds),Faith, Rcason, andRationality (Rowman & Litdefield Publishers, Inc., 1996): lI9-33. of Re I igi on, 2nd edn. (Belmont, CA:'l7adswonh, I 999). \flierenga, E., The Freedom of God', Faith and Philnsoplry 19 (2002):425-36.